By Dina Guirguis
US Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson delivered a speech
on June 18 at the headquarters of the Ibn Khaldun Center, a venerated
non-governmental organization in Cairo, “to set the record straight” on
the US government's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. Patterson
defended US support of Egypt’s government, emphasizing its “elected
nature.” While she expressed an understanding of what she deemed
"conspiracy theories" on US support for the Brotherhood, she ultimately
dismissed them, noting that "Egypt deserves better... citizens with open
minds who are unafraid to think for themselves." Just one day later,
Patterson held a meeting with Khairat al-Shater—a
man who holds no government position but is deputy Supreme Guide of the
Brotherhood. Indeed, both Patterson's messaging, reflected in her talk
at Ibn Khaldun, and her actions, exemplified by the meeting with
al-Shater, lend credence to these same conspiracy theories.
In her speech, Patterson repeated the familiar US government refrain
heard throughout the past year: the Morsi government is democratically
elected, deriving its legitimacy from a ballot box “that met
international standards.” She also derided “street action” in favor of
organized political party participation. In doing so, Patterson
overlooked the declared US stance of not ‘picking sides,’ but rather
supporting democratic principles and standing behind the will of the
Egyptian people.
In the past year, Egypt has been the victim of egregious governance
failures with thousands suffering from significant power and water
outages, fuel shortages, insecurity, and a denial of justice and
dignity. With these issues remaining largely unaddressed, the presidency
has, over the past year, instead issued a constitutional declaration
muzzling the judiciary in November 2012, drafted an oppressive NGO law,
and more recently expanded Islamist levers on executive power through
select gubernatorial appointments.
Morsi, who won Egypt’s presidential elections by a mere 51 percent,
was given a strong boost by revolutionary elements who were
disillusioned with other candidates and decided to place their faith in
Morsi’s promise to serve as a “president for all Egyptians.”
In less
than one year, Morsi and his Islamist party have alienated the very
group that played a significant role in bringing him to power by
usurping the constitutional drafting process and reneging on promises to
build consensus. The move resulted in a highly flawed constitutional
document stemming from an unconstitutional assembly.
Claiming executive privilege, Morsi issued a constitutional
declaration that had several components, including an executive—and
unconstitutional—decision to remove the Prosecutor General and grant
extensive presidential immunity.
The response to this declaration was swift and unequivocal. In scenes reminiscent of the early days of the uprising, tens of thousands
of Egyptians from all walks of life joined to peacefully protest. In
the Itihadeya December 5 attacks, protesters were rained upon by
supporters of the president, who had been called upon by the
Brotherhood’s Essam al-Erian to "defend [Morsi’s] legitimacy." Eleven Egyptians were killed that day, and images of torture and abduction committed by the President’s supporters surfaced. Perhaps most shocking was the documentation
of those carrying out the attacks marching in sync like militias,
chanting pro-Brotherhood slogans. The state police apparatus,
noticeably, stood on the sidelines making no real effort to curtail the
violence.
Morsi’s response to the Itihadeya attack, accusing protesters of
being paid thugs and affirming the actions of his vigilante supporters
only empowered his proponents and encouraged more vigilante action,
starting a wave of unfair arrests and politically charged prosecutions
of his critics, including activist Alaa Abdel Fattah and media
personality Mahmoud Saad. Morsi remained silent as his supporters even
laid siege to Egypt's venerated Supreme Court. With his actions, Morsi
effectively lost his claim of being a "president for all Egyptians."
When Morsi immunized his decisions from judicial review, explicitly
violating the Constitution he swore to uphold, his legitimacy in the
eyes of the law became suspect. Morsi's subsequent selective respect of
judicial decisions depending on how Brotherhood friendly they were
further eroded his electoral legitimacy. Moreover, in the eyes of many
Egyptians, Morsi's popular legitimacy was premised on his campaign
commitments to uphold the principles of democracy and respect
revolutionary calls for social equality. Consequently, such
legitimacy has continued to plummet with the arrests of activists, a
crackdown on civil society, flouting of the law and government
institutions, and ongoing sectarian violence.
Coupled with a failing economy and nationwide unrest, the situation is dire; a recent Zogby Research Services poll
indicates that support for Morsi is hovering at 28 percent, while over
70 percent of respondents had concerns about the Brotherhood’s vision
for Egypt.
With a recognition of the Morsi government's repression of most
institutionalized channels of dissent, Tamarod (Rebel) emerged in May as
a grassroots movement with a goal to gather 15 million signatures
(higher than the number of votes Morsi won) to withdraw confidence from
the President, establish a basis by which to call for early presidential
elections, and stage mass peaceful protests on June 30. As of June 20,
Tamarod reported it successfully garnered more than 15 million
signatures, tapping into a broad segment of the population and a network
of volunteers not affiliated with formal political channels. Tamarod’s
undeniable success thus far is a testament to the very street action of
which Patterson is “deeply skeptical”.
In her remarks and actions, Patterson implicitly chose to side with
the Brotherhood regime. Her outreach has been selective, and often
focused on the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization in lieu of formal
political entities, yet she fails to similarly engage the opposition.
She continues to press the opposition to repeatedly participate in
specious exercises of national dialogue in which no substantive
concessions are made by the Morsi regime. Furthermore, in echoing the
Brotherhood’s singular discourse of ‘electoral legitimacy,’ she has
alienated the opposition and disregarded the dynamics and voice of the
Egyptian street, which has been a powerful yet unpredictable force since
Mubarak was overthrown some two and a half years ago.
But legitimacy that comes with an election is neither unqualified nor
unconditional. Violating the oath of office and governing
undemocratically undermines the legitimacy that can be claimed through
the ballot box. An election alone does not a democracy make—Egyptians
are fed up with superficial processes and demand the
institutionalization of democratic practices; they will do so through
any and all legitimate and peaceful means, including but not limited to
street action, in coordination with organized political opposition
activity.
Rather than understand and remedy the perception that the US is
supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, Ambassador Patterson is continuing
the age-old US practice in Egypt of being the last man standing to
support an authoritarian regime. In so doing, the US is once again
putting itself in an increasingly lonely camp, contributing to ongoing
instability, and hurting its own image and credibility with the Egyptian
people.
Dina Guirguis is an Egyptian American attorney and activist.
SoRo: One wonders if President Obama seriously wants to or even can maintain this position in the wake of the largest political protest in the history of civilisation - all due to community organising, which I believe he claims to know something about and supports. Does he really want to be on 'the wrong side of history,' again?
As for Morsi being 'democratically elected,' so was Adolf Hitler.
Related Reading:
http://tinyurl.com/krppd8q
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