The entitlement state imbalances budgets and enervates citizens
Imagine
a foreign visitor who has learned just one fact about America: For the
past century our politics has been defined by a contest between two
movements, one intermittently calling itself “progressive” and the other
more consistently calling itself “conservative.” He would rightly
conclude from those labels that partisans of the two movements agree
that the arc of history bends toward progressivism and away from
conservatism. Progressives, that is, believe they have history’s wind in
their sails. They constitute, in that sense, the party of the future.
Conservatives, on the other hand, are committed to the stewardship and
transmission of a legacy that is both vulnerable, thereby requiring
conservation, and valuable, thereby deserving it. Conservatives thus
constitute the party of the past.
Progressives are animated, in the late Richard Rorty’s words, by “the
hope that life will eventually be freer, less cruel, more leisured,
richer in goods and experiences, not just for our descendants but for
everyone’s descendants.” Progressives of a century ago believed that
progress meant movement toward a known destination, and that the ways to
effect it were demonstrable. In the 1930s, around the time they began
calling themselves “liberals,” progressives abandoned the conceit that
social sciences could, in Condorcet’s phrase, “foresee the progress of
humankind, direct it, and accelerate it” in the way the natural sciences
understand physical laws and thereby direct and accelerate material
progress. But their optimism is undiminished. They continue to believe
in “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,” as Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote in a 1958 Supreme
Court opinion, even if they deny the possibility of formulating criteria
whereby we could know that our standards are improving, not just
changing.
Conservatism, by contrast, lends itself to wariness. Samuel Johnson’s
rule that “men more frequently require to be reminded than informed”
comports with the conservative inclination to believe that old wisdom is
plentiful while new wisdom is scarce and suspect. What disheartens is
the need to remind the same people of the same things, over and over,
entreating them not to squander legacies hard won and repeatedly
vindicated. Thomas Sowell once wrote that much of modern social history
“has involved replacing what worked with what sounded good.” Or, as
William F. Buckley Jr. lamented in National Review’s
first issue in 1955: “Instead of covetously consolidating its premises,
the United States seems tormented by its tradition of fixed postulates
having to do with the meaning of existence, with the relationship of the
state to the individual, of the individual to his neighbor, so clearly
enunciated in the enabling documents of our Republic.”
In the same publisher’s statement, Buckley famously declared that National Review
“stands athwart history, yelling Stop.” He remarked further on the
challenge of living in “a world dominated by the jubilant
single-mindedness of the practicing Communist, with his inside track to
History.” A third of a century later that track turned out to lead to
the collapse of one of the hardest despotisms human beings have ever
endured. Sometimes if you yell “Stop,” history obeys.
And sometimes it doesn’t. The issue of National Review
published immediately after the 2012 election declared that contest to
have been a “terrible defeat,” “debacle,” and “catastrophe” for
conservatism. In a world where Soviet Communism has been consigned to
the dustbin of history, such judgments might sound excessive. Since the
end of the Cold War, conservatives have warned against the
“Swedenization” of America. These warnings are, most directly, about a
policy regime wherein government spending accounts for more than half of
gross domestic product and government regulation is the biggest factor
affecting the generation of the rest.
Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
show that, in 2010, all government spending in Sweden equaled 53 percent
of GDP. The same figure was 55 percent in Finland, 56 percent in
France, and 58 percent in Denmark. Sweden’s comparative austerity
suggests that vigilance against the “Denmarkation of America” would be
more apposite. Federal-, state-, and local-government expenditures in
2010 amounted to 42 percent of America’s GDP, which means that we’re
behind Europe, but not that far behind. Moreover, we’re catching up: In
2000, government spending in the U.S. accounted for 34 percent of GDP.
Well, what are a few percentage points of GDP among friends? By this
rudimentary measure of government outlays as a proportion of national
income, America already differs from Scandinavia in degree rather than
in kind. If conservatives want to avert the Swedenization of America,
they need to explain, more comprehensively than they have done so far,
the deplorability of that outcome, since Western European social
democracy appears benign where Eastern European Communism was manifestly
grotesque.
That polemical mission can be pursued
by way of two arguments — one sweeping, the other restricted.
Swedenization could be bad because it’s bad for human beings, or just
because it’s bad for Americans. If the former, then America should
reject social democracy as a regime that would debilitate any nation. If
the latter, then social democracy might work well enough in some
countries, but Americans should reject it as irreconcilable with their
republic’s distinctive character.
Most of the conservative case to date has inclined to the larger,
categorical contention that the growth of government spending, and of
government generally, must anywhere lead to insolvency. “To assure every
entrepreneur and every job creator that their investments in America
will not vanish as have those in Greece, we will cut the deficit and put
America on track to a balanced budget,” Mitt Romney said in his speech
at the Republican convention. It is at least arguable, however, that
the economic calamities in southern Europe tell us more about how
cultures of corruption exploited a lunatic experiment in multinational
currency than about the essential qualities of social democracy. In
2010, Sweden’s government revenues were 99 percent of government
spending, Denmark’s equaled 95 percent, and France’s were 87 percent,
meaning that those countries’ big spenders were also big taxers.
Politicians win power there by persuading citizens that, while generous
government benefits will indeed require high taxes, they’ll be better
off with that combination than with the alternative: keeping more of
their earnings in exchange for the government’s curtailing benefits.
In America, by contrast, government revenues equaled 75 percent of
outlays in 2010, meaning that federal, state, and local governments
borrowed one dollar for every three they summoned the language and
courage to raise by taxation. Northern Europe, in other words, finances
big welfare states with heavy taxes and little borrowing, while the U.S.
finances a smaller one with lighter taxes and extensive borrowing. That
difference supports the narrower contention that Swedenization is
un-American but not necessarily untenable in any polity. Our deeply
rooted, don’t-tread-on-me Jeffersonianism means that we cannot be
persuaded to buy even a relatively modest welfare state unless a
significant portion of the purchase is financed with debt. In this we
are unlike the Europeans, who want cradle-to-grave welfare states enough
to pay cash for them.
There are good reasons to believe, even after November 2012, that
Americans are indeed not Europeans, and will be more receptive to
revising existing social-welfare programs and resisting new ones than to
massive tax increases. The fact that victorious Democrats still dare
not seek even one dollar in additional federal taxes from anyone below
the 98th percentile of the income distribution — though everyone
understands that big spending cuts will eventually be inescapable
without such increases — is the strongest evidence that America remains,
in this respect, exceptional.
Big differences among nations can become smaller, however, and seemingly
durable ones can crumble. It is telling that Republicans have been no
bolder or more successful in reducing government by leveraging
Americans’ aversion to taxation than Democrats have been in raising
taxes by leveraging Americans’ aversion to austerity. As Molly
Michelmore, a historian at Washington and Lee University, argues in the
new book Tax and Spend, the “consequences of a liberal
consensus that promised the cost-free expansion of the activist state
and a conservative counterrevolution that promised its cost-free contraction has been a political and ideological stalemate.”
Stalemates usually resolve in one direction or the other. The 2012
elections don’t prove, but do suggest, the resolution will be on liberal
terms. On Election Day, Californians approved a ballot proposition
increasing taxes, despite abundant evidence that the state’s public
sector had been falling well short of getting the most bang for the
mountain of bucks already at its disposal. Most of the increase was in
the income taxes on affluent Californians, along the lines of what
Democrats have won at the national level. The top bracket, on taxable
income above $1 million, will increase from 10.3 percent to 13.3
percent. Three new brackets will also increase income-tax rates on
Californians making between $250,000 and $1 million. In the wake of the
fiscal-cliff resolution in Congress, this means that Californian
families with taxable incomes above $450,000 (and individuals making
more than $400,000) will face combined federal and state marginal
income-tax rates above 50 percent. Arguments that such increases will
make the state’s finances more unstable — both because rich Californians
may choose to reside and do business in other states rather than be
taxed at that level, and because heavy reliance on top-bracket income
taxes means state revenues will soar and plummet over the course of the
business cycle — were unavailing. Moreover, the tax increase, approved
with more than 55 percent of the popular vote, cannot be interpreted
simply as an act of redistributive zeal. The state sales tax, already
the highest in the nation at 7.25 percent, will be increased to 7.5
percent as a result of the ballot proposition.
Finally, as a result of the 2012 elections, more than two-thirds of
the members of each house of California’s state legislature will be
Democrats. Thus, the high wall erected in 1978 by Proposition 13, which
requires a supermajority to raise taxes, can now be breached without a
single Republican vote. California, home to one-eighth of the U.S.
population, is the birthplace of the national tax revolt, triggered by
the passage of that ballot proposition almost 35 years ago. If Americans
in general continue to become more like Californians, and if
Californians are becoming more like Swedes in their desire for activist
government and their willingness to pay for it, then 2012 will be
remembered as the beginning of the national tax capitulation.
Such a development argues that we are
becoming Swedenized in a deeper sense: not just adopting
social-democratic policies but acquiring a sociological character that
will leave us resembling present-day Europe more than the America
Tocqueville discovered, in which families, communities, and churches
turned individualism from a social solvent into a social adhesive. In a
2009 lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, where he is a
resident scholar, Charles Murray made the connection between governance
and sociology this way: “Almost anything that government does in social
policy can be characterized as taking some of the trouble out of
things.” The problem, according to Murray, is that “every time the
government takes some of the trouble out of performing the functions of
family, community, vocation, and faith, it also strips those
institutions of some of their vitality — it drains some of the life from
them.”
In I Am the Change, an analysis of President Obama’s political
philosophy, Claremont McKenna government professor Charles Kesler says
the “First Law of Big Government” is that “the more power we give
government, the more rights it will give us.” The “rights” in that
bargain are really wants, such as the “right” to “rest, recreation, and
adventure” promised by one New Deal board, or the “right” to “enjoy the
arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits,” one of
dozens enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Kesler’s
formulation speaks to Americans’ inner Jeffersonianism, challenging
them to covetously consolidate those genuine inalienable rights with
which they have been endowed by their Creator. Tell a modern European,
however, that in exchange for permitting the government to superintend
citizens’ lives in ever greater detail it will bestow still more
social-welfare rights, and the reaction will not be “Who do you think
you are?” but “Where do I sign, and how soon do I get my benefits?”
The case against Swedenization, then, is that it threatens a soft and
insidious despotism. Unlike the totalitarianism of the USSR, where the
evil flowed from the top down, engulfing every aspect of society, the
danger posed by social democracy is of social, political, and economic
debilitations’ compounding one another. Progressivism began as, and
remains, “an alliance of experts and victims,” according to Harvey
Mansfield, a professor of government at Harvard. It gains strength as
the experts assert their expertise more confidently and the victims
accept their helplessness more compliantly. The kind of robust mediating
structures Tocqueville thought essential to the success of democracy in
America will not prevail against that alliance. If the experts
determine that employer-provided health insurance must include
contraception, the objections of religious organizations opposed to some
or all forms of contraception are immaterial. The possibility that the
republic’s free citizens could initiate financial or employment
arrangements to secure contraceptives, rather than relying completely on
government directives to their employers, is also ruled out of order.
Swedenization might work indefinitely in Sweden, a country whose
population is 8 percent smaller than Los Angeles County’s and
immeasurably less heterogeneous. As New York Times columnist Ross
Douthat recently explained, Sweden has “no real linguistic or religious
diversity, no experience of chattel slavery or mass immigration . . .
and a culture of Lutheran thrift and prudence that endures even though
Lutheranism itself is on life support.” The accompanying deference to
experts and tax collectors, combined with residual social norms, could,
he contends, “demonstrate that it’s possible for a welfare-state society
to survive the waning of religion and the decline of traditional
marriage without sacrificing middle class prosperity.”
It is also possible that Swedenization won’t work indefinitely, even
in Sweden. Europeans’ admirable willingness to pay for the government
programs they demand will be inundated by a demographic tide that leaves
fewer and fewer workers supporting more and more retirees. Leftist
politicians and writers treat this shift as an exogenous variable, an
unfortunate contingency that has befallen the welfare state but reveals
nothing essential about it. Megan McArdle and Ramesh Ponnuru have argued
persuasively, however, that both social science and common sense
suggest the welfare state is complicit in its own fiscal peril. Before
the welfare state, I relied on my children to take care of me in my
dotage, and you relied on yours to take care of you. After it, we rely
on all our children to take care of all of us. The welfare state thus
creates strong incentives for individuals to have fewer children of
their own and rely instead on aggregated financial support from
everyone’s children, thereby putting social-security systems under
intolerable strain. Ponnuru cites two recent studies showing that the
generosity of Europe’s welfare systems explains about half of the
difference between the continent’s fertility rates, insufficient in
every country to prevent the population from shrinking, and America’s,
which remains above the level needed for population growth.
There is another sense in which Swedenization undermines itself. “The
Scandinavian welfare states, which express so well a sense of obligation
to distant strangers, are beginning to make it more difficult to
express a sense of obligation to those with whom one shares family
ties,” the Boston College sociologist Alan Wolfe has written. Most
consequentially, those high, widely applied taxes make raising children
in single-income families financially daunting. Even deeply reluctant
couples can afford no choice other than entrusting their small children
to the subsidized day-care center so that both parents can set off each
morning to earn heavily taxed salaries.
“The irony of this development,” Wolfe writes, “may be that as
intimate ties weaken, so will distant ones, thus undermining the very
moral strengths the welfare state has shown.” The consummation of the
liberal project was suggested when Marian Wright Edelman, founder of the
Children’s Defense Fund, lamented our regrettable inclination to
“distinguish between our own children and other people’s children.” When
all children and dependent seniors are “my” children and “my” parents,
however, none of them are mine. The effort to socialize our affections
and obligations ends up attenuating them. Social democracy thus
compounds democracy’s most ominous tendency, namely that, in
Tocqueville’s famous phrase, it “constantly leads [each man] back toward
himself alone and threatens finally to confine him wholly in the
solitude of his own heart.”
The most dismaying explanation of the
2012 election was the public-opinion survey showing that 21 percent of
the voters rated “cares about people like me” as the quality they most
sought in a presidential candidate, one more important to them than the
proffered alternatives: “shares my values,” is “a strong leader,” and
has “a vision for the future.” Romney bested Obama among voters who
considered any of these other three categories most important. The 21
out of every 100 voters who cared above all that the president cared
about people like them broke for Obama against Romney, however — and by
the landslide ratio of 17 to 4.
This is bad news, even allowing that fatuous poll questions elicit
fatuous poll results. To the extent the survey is believable, a fifth of
our fellow citizens now stand ready to reprise Barbara Walters’s
entreaty to Jimmy Carter after his election as president: “Be wise with
us, governor. Be good to us.” This supplicatory attitude is not the way a
people capable and worthy of sustaining its republic regards elected
public servants. The point is not that we should desire a president who
is indifferent to us. It is, rather, that our republic’s health will be
marked not by how much our politicians care for us, but by our ability
and resolve to care for ourselves, and for our families and communities.
Presidents, and governments, can do some things to invigorate those
social ties, but can do many more to weaken them. Limiting government is
necessary, but not sufficient, for strengthening civil society. Doing
both is necessary for preventing American self-government from
succumbing to a social-democratic experiment that may not work anywhere,
and cannot work here.
– Mr. Voegeli is a senior editor of the Claremont Review of Books, a visiting scholar at Claremont McKenna College’s Henry Salvatori Center, and the author of Never Enough: America’s Limitless Welfare State.
Related Reading:
A Message To Leftists In The US & The UK From Sweden
The Non-Existent To Socialist Heaven In Sweden
Hey, Progs! Wanna Be Like Europe? How 'Bout You Start By Eliminating Estate Taxes?
Big Government Robs From The Middle Class Because That's Where the Money Is!
Against Swedenisation
A Message To Leftists In The US & The UK From Sweden
The Non-Existent To Socialist Heaven In Sweden
Hey, Progs! Wanna Be Like Europe? How 'Bout You Start By Eliminating Estate Taxes?
Big Government Robs From The Middle Class Because That's Where the Money Is!
Against Swedenisation
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