By Jeffrey Rosen of The New Republic
he Justice Department white paper released
on Monday by NBC News is the public's first direct glimpse at the legal
reasoning that the Obama administration relied on in using a drone
strike to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen living in Yemen. The
memo's arguments are troubling on many levels. Although the Obama
administration's brief is directed at the assassination of Americans
abroad, the arguments it offers could apply with equal force to the
assassination of Americans at home; lawyers for the Bush administration
who tried to justify lesser outrages have been pilloried for supporting
torture. But perhaps most troubling is the administration’s attempt to
redefine the idea of the kind of “imminent threat” that can justify a
targeted assassination.
The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held
that the police can only use deadly force against fleeing, dangerous
suspects when killing the suspect is “necessary to prevent the escape
and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others.” But, in a vast expansion of this narrow precedent, the Obama
administration says that the U.S. is not required “to have clear
evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take
place in the immediate future” in order to assassinate U.S. citizens
whom the government believes are Al-Qaeda leaders. Instead, the memo
argues a “decision maker determining whether an al-Qaeda operational
leader presents an imminent threat of violent attack against the United
States must take into account that certain members of al-Qaeda …. are
continually plotting attacks against the United States; that Al-Qaeda
would engage in such attacks regularly to the extent it were able to do
so; that the U.S. government may not be aware of all al-Qaeda plots as
they are developing and thus cannot be confident that none is about to
occur.”
In light of the government’s possible ignorance of plots
that may or may not exist, the memo concludes, when an al-Qaeda leader
“has recently been involved in activities posing an imminent threat of
violent attack against the United States, and there is no evidence
suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that
member’s involvement in al-Qaida’s continuing terrorist campaign against
the United States would support the conclusion that the member poses an
imminent threat.”
This is an extraordinary conclusion. In Fourth
Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has stressed that “the use of deadly
force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the
circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that
all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses
no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm
resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of
deadly force to do so.” In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected
the eighteenth century rule allowing the use of whatever force is
necessary to arrest a fleeing felon because “changes in the legal and
technological context”—namely, the expansion of felonies to include
non-violent offenses and new weapons technology (in particular,
automatic guns) that make it possible for the police to kill suspects
whom they previously would have had to physically subdue.
The
Obama administration takes this narrow precedent and twists it beyond
recognition. While the Supreme Court cited the existence of new weapons
technology as a reason for narrowing the conditions under which the
police can use deadly force, the Obama administration uses drone
technology as an excuse for broadening those conditions. “What would
constitute a reasonable use of lethal force for purposes of domestic law
enforcement differs substantially from what would be reasonable in
[this] situation,” the administration concludes. (In fact, the
possibility of tracking suspected terrorists with drones, rather than
killing them, suggests that targeted assassinations are even more
constitutionally vulnerable today than they would have been at the time
of the American framing.)
When officials conclude that “capture is
infeasible,” the memo continues, “the intrusion of any Fourth Amendment
interests would be outweighed by …. the interest in protecting the
lives of Americans.” But of course, the question of whether American
lives are, in fact, imminently threatened by a particular suspect is
precisely the determination that the administration claims the right to
make on its own—without an opportunity for an independent judge to
examine the factual basis for the claim. “There exists no appropriate
judicial forum to evaluate these constitutional considerations,” the
Justice Department insists.
This “trust us” argument is precisely the one the Supreme Court rejected
in the 2004 Hamdi, where the Court upheld the Bush administration’s
power to detain enemy combatants, on the grounds that it had been
authorized by Congress, but only after insisting that suspects could
challenge the factual basis for their detention before a neutral
decision maker. The Obama administration repeatedly invokes the Hamdi
case to justify targeted assassinations, which have been specifically
prohibited by Congress, and then omits the Supreme Court’s requirement
that independent judges need to have the last word on whether or not
suspects are, in fact, as dangerous as the administration claims.
The
principle that core constitutional rights can’t be abridged unless
there’s an imminent threat of violence isn’t only central to the Supreme
Court’s understanding of the Fourth Amendment. It’s also the keystone
of the Court’s understanding of the First Amendment protections for free
speech. In his concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California, the greatest opinion on free speech in
American history, Justice Louis Brandeis objected to a law that made it a
crime for a member of the Communist Labor Party of California to teach
syndicalism, an anarchic alternative to capitalism.
Brandeis
objected that “the accused is to be punished not for contempt,
incitement, or conspiracy, but for a step in preparation, which, if it
threatens the public order at all, does so only remotely.” Brandeis
insisted that speech could only be banned if it “would produce, or is
intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive
evil which the State constitutionally may seek to prevent.” He added
that there must be “reasonable grounds to believe” that the danger is
imminent and serious. And, in a reminder of his faith in public
deliberation, he said the danger had to be “so imminent” that it was
likely to occur “before there is opportunity for full discussion …. Only
an emergency can justify repression.” Finally, like the Supreme Court
in Hamdi, Brandeis insisted on the importance of neutral, judicial
review. “It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law
abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no
emergency justifying it.” Brandeis’s reasoning was adopted by the
Supreme Court in a 1969 decision
holding that speech can never be suppressed unless there is a serious
threat of imminent violence; the Obama administration, ignoring this
precedent, wants to justify not only suppressing speech but also
assassinating citizens without specific and credible evidence of
imminent violence.
There are other reasons to object to the
administration’s justification of targeted assassinations—including its
questionable claim that they are legally supported by Congress’s
authorization of the use of force after 9/11. On pragmatic grounds, the
administration's brief is a disaster: As the Church Commission found
after studying the attempted assassinations of Castro, targeted killings
are likely to produce an international backlash that threatens far more
American lives than they protect. But, as a legal matter, the casual,
and unpersuasive, attempt to read out of American constitutional law the
principle that government can only kill citizens in order to prevent
imminent death or violence in return is the most objectionable of all.
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