Q&A:
You traveled to Syria during the Syrian civil war, right? When were you there, what were you doing there and what did you see?
Yes, I have traveled into Syria on a number of occasions over the
last year and a half. The first time was in February, 2012 and the most
recent visit was in March, 2013. On each occasion, I was there for
reporting purposes and I interviewed rebel fighters, civilians, Kurdish
militiamen, and civilian political activists. I also visited the
frontline areas in Aleppo city and witnessed clashes between the two
sides, on which I later reported.
The Obama administration is telling the American people that
the rebels aren’t composed primarily of al-Qaida fighters — that there
are moderate rebels. Supporters of intervention point to an op-ed by
Elizabeth O’Bagy, who has also traveled through rebel controlled
territory, in which she says, “Moderate opposition forces … continue to
lead the fight against the Syrian regime.” She also writes that “there
is still a large moderate force with some shared U.S. interests.” What
do you make of this and who are the “moderates” the administration
speaks of? From your experience, are they John Locke and Montesquieu
enthusiasts?
I can only speak regarding my own experiences and my own knowledge.
Undoubtedly outside of Syria, and in the Syrian opposition structures,
there are civilian political activists and leaders who are opposed to
al-Qaida and opposed to Islamism. There are also civilian activists and
structures within the country which are opposed to al-Qaida and
Islamism. But when one looks at the armed rebel groups, one finds an
obvious vast majority there who are adherents of Islamism of one kind or
another — stretching from Muslim Brotherhood-type formations all the
way across to groups openly aligned with al-Qaida central and with
al-Zawahiri.
The “moderate” force which we are told about supposedly consists of
those rebel brigades aligned with the Supreme Military Command, of
Major-General Salim Edriss. Most of the units aligned with the SMC
actually come from a 20 unit strong bloc called the Syrian Islamic
Liberation Front. This includes some powerful brigades, such as Liwa
al-Islam in the Damascus area, Liwa al Farouq and Liwa al Tawhid. These
and the overwhelming majority of the units aligned with the SMC are
Islamist formations, who adhere to a Muslim Brotherhood-type outlook. I
spent some time with the Tawhid Brigade in Aleppo city at the height of
the fighting there. I interviewed one of the leaders of the brigade.
I’ve been in the Middle East for a long time and have worked on these
issues for a long time. This was an Islamist fighting force, adhering to
an Islamist ideology. So even those forces nominally aligned with
western supported bodies are themselves overwhelmingly Islamist in
outlook (there may be a very small and marginal number of forces who are
ostensibly secular, but these are of no military significance). Its my
contention that the real power in the rebellion lies not in the external
structures, but among the commanders of the major fighting groups.
These men are Islamists.
If the rebels were to win the Syrian civil war, what would a rebel-controlled Syria look like?
I think that if the rebels were to destroy the regime and take
Damascus, then a subsequent civil war would then commence between
different rebel formations, probably pitting the Muslim Brotherhood-type
units against the more extreme Salafis and the al-Qaida-types. The
rebels would also then commence war against the Kurds who control an
enclave of northeast Syria, in an attempt to reunify the country. These
subsequent wars could go on a long time. At the end of it, I would
think that the MB-types would most likely be victorious and a Syria
controlled by one or another group of Sunni Islamists would most likely
come into being — though of course this is only speculation and its
impossible to know in this regard.
What do you make of President Obama’s handling of the Syria situation? Do you think the U.S. should intervene?
I did support a rapid response following the use by the regime of
chemical weapons on a large scale on August 21. I don’t think it was
necessary to begin a huge political process and to telegraph intentions,
and it doesn’t surprise me that that whole great mountain has now given
birth to the mouse of no action at all. Israel’s actions over the last
year in Syria offer I think an object lesson in how to enforce red
lines. Go in quickly and forcefully, deliver the lesson, achieve the
objective and get out — with the proviso that the action can be repeated
if deemed necessary. That didn’t happen in this case with the U.S., and
I think instead the administration came across as vacillating and
indecisive — and glad to take the fig leaf that the Russian president
provided for it.
What is the opinion of Israeli leadership of the president’s
handling of the situation in Syria? Some have said that Israel may be
more likely to strike Iran now because of the Obama administration’s
bungling.
I think there is a great deal of dismay and disappointment at the
weakness of the U.S. response. But I think it is important not to be
simplistic here — Iran obviously features far higher on the list of U.S.
national security priorities than does Syria, so I don’t think there
will be an automatic assumption that the behavior pattern on Syria will
reflect the pattern on Iran. So I don’t think one should begin any
countdown to an Israeli strike on Iran deriving from the U.S. weak
position on Syria.
Do you think there is a serious threat to the Syrian civil
war destabilizing Jordan? How serious a blow would that be to Israel and
America, and what is the best way to prevent such a catastrophe?
Undoubtedly Jordan has been negatively affected by a massive influx
of Syrian refugees. At the same time, as of now at least the political
implications or effects of that in Jordan have been relatively minor.
The Jordanian monarchy’s survival is a key interest of Israel and Saudi
Arabia, and indeed of the U.S. too, so my sense is that if the king gets
into trouble he will find, as the king of Bahrain found when he got
into trouble in early 2011, that he has plenty of friends willing to
assist him. Saudi Arabia will provide large amounts of money to tide the
Jordanians through. Israel will undoubtedly provide behind the scenes
assistance on the security front. I think Jordan is less weak than it is
sometimes presented as.
How is America viewed in the Middle East nearly five years into the Obama administration?
I think the U.S. is seen widely as a country that does not stick by
its friends and does not punish its enemies. It is seen this way both by
friends (such as Israel, Jordan, Lebanese moderates, Gulf monarchs) and
by enemies (Iran, Assad, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah). The
friends are dismayed by this, the enemies are invigorated. It isn’t a
good way to be seen in a region where patronage and the building of
alliances is the essence of success. I think the rapid abandonment of
Mubarak in Egypt, the failure to grasp the danger represented by the
Muslim Brotherhood, and the failure to act decisively in Syria when
there was still time to build a rebellion led by pro-western,
non-Islamist officers all contribute to this perception.
Can you compare and contrast how Obama is viewed in the
Middle East today compared to how George W. Bush was viewed at the end
of his presidency?
All the indications are that the U.S. is no more popular in the
Middle East today than it was in the last year of the Bush
administration. The difference, I would say, is that while Bush was
hated by America’s enemies in the region, they also regarded him at
least to some degree as a serious customer who understood the way power
is wielded and knew how to reward friends and punish enemies. This isn’t
the case with Obama. Lets take Egypt as an example: there, the fight is
between the army regime and the Islamists. In the days of Bush, the
army regime of Mubarak respected the U.S. president and relied on him,
and the Islamists hated Bush but also took him seriously as an enemy.
With Obama, the army regime of al-Sisi despises and scorns Obama because
of his abandonment of Mubarak and his failure to back the recent army
coup against the anti-US Muslim Brotherhood. But the Muslim Brotherhood
also hates Obama no less than they did Bush. Indeed, in a way that would
be funny if it weren’t tragic, both sides in Egypt now try to make out
that America is backing their enemy.
If President Obama called you up today, what advice would you give him?
See above. I’d tell him that its vital for regional and maybe global
order that the U.S. stand at the head of a coherent alliance of states
in the Middle East, able to face down enemies. This can be
re-established through the judicious backing of friends (Israel, Sisi in
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi) and determined stances and action against
enemies. This goal must be the watchword. All else will follow from
setting this clear goal.
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