The entire history of what is now the European Union must be seen as an
attempted answer to “the German problem”. So it is fitting, if not
desirable, that the crisis of the eurozone has brought matters back to where
they all began – the natural dominance of Germany on the continent of Europe.
This is not a new point. Nicholas Ridley, in his notorious Spectator interview in 1990, predicted, in essence, what has now come to pass, and lost his ministerial job as a result. The only problem with the Ridley analysis, and similar views put forward with slightly more circumspection by his boss Margaret Thatcher, was that their tone was anti-German. This made people think that they were out-of-date, obsessed with the Second World War and unable to give Germany the credit it deserved. It blinded critics to the prescience of the grumpy duo. The Ridley/Thatcher argument was that French-led attempts to “tie down” Germany with greater European integration would have precisely the opposite effect. In particular, if a European single currency were introduced, it would be the Deutschmark in all but name. The model for “more Europe” would assuredly produce a German Europe.
So it has proved, never more visibly than last week in Cyprus. It is extremely interesting to see this admitted and analysed by a German. Ulrich Beck is a sociologist, but don’t be put off. He also has almost batty theories about how the EU can – must – be saved by some sort of European social contract and a “voluntary European year for all” in which Germans go and live in Greece and vice versa and see the other fellows’ point of view. Leave these ideas politely on one side. Concentrate instead on his brilliant and succinct analysis (the entire book is under 100 pages long) of the political genius of Angela Merkel.
Professor Beck does not like her politics at all, but he sets out lucidly why she is winning. Behind the mask of sober, correct Protestantism lurks a supremely adroit calculation of power. He calls her “Merkiavelli”.
Her methods are making her “the uncrowned queen of Europe”. The most cunning is “hesitation as a means of coercion”. Instead of forcing German money on debtor euro-states, she hints that she might not offer it at all. Gradually and bitterly, they come to realise that “Only one fate is worse than being overwhelmed by German money and that is not being overwhelmed by German money”. They succumb to her demands.
Learning from Machiavelli that the successful ruler is both loved and feared, but that, if you have to choose, it is better to be feared, Mrs Merkel has devised a brilliant strategy. She is loved at home (because she is seen to fight for German interests) and feared abroad (for the same reason). Like a one-woman hard cop/soft cop routine, she says yes and no to eurozone integration at the same time. She is a tough nationalist and a good European. No other eurozone leader has a chance against this.
Besides, Mrs Merkel’s power is grounded in the strength of the German economy and is therefore very mobile. This is much more effective than the old-fashioned German military power which proved so expensive for all concerned twice in the 20th century. As Professor Beck puts it, Germany “has no need to invade, and yet it is ubiquitous”. This too was originally a Ridley point, considered grossly offensive at the time he used it.
On top of this, Merkiavelli has not merely issued orders to the other member states, she has ensured that the German culture of “stability” in economic affairs is the orthodoxy of the age. True, there is not, as yet, a single example of German-style austerity policies actually working in the southern countries on whom it has been inflicted, but that hardly seems to matter in the terms of power politics. So strong is the idea of German financial rectitude, says Prof Beck, that Germans largely avoid being painted as the ruthless masters of Europe by being seen as “the schoolmasters of Europe”. As their youth unemployment rises to over 50 per cent, countries such as Spain and Greece can be cowed by the Merkel teaching that it is all their fault for their indiscipline and learn that they must be more “correct”. The German Europe is therefore a reality not only of power, but of official ideology. No previous German leader has achieved that.
And because modern, united, prosperous, democratic Germany is now “the best Germany we have ever had”, it is also jettisoning all the old “never again”, guilt-ridden stuff which Germans are so fed up with. It gives them permission to be proud once again – “we hear the sigh of a new 'never again’: never again should they [the Germans] have to appear as penitents”.
All this upsets Prof Beck very much, because his beloved EU has become a German-led hierarchy instead of the equality he seeks. Yet how could it be otherwise? He cannot see this, because he refuses to accept the fact that the nation-state, especially for a country of Germany’s size, remains the strongest organising principle and focus of loyalty. Mrs Merkel has a democratic mandate in the way that the EU institutions could never have. When they spoke of “Europe”, the Germans, benign though they had become, were always thinking of themselves. So they have come out on top. Unlike Prof Beck, I say, good on them for that – why shouldn’t they? I just wish the European elites had recognised this a generation earlier. It might have saved us the impoverishment of half a continent.
This is not a new point. Nicholas Ridley, in his notorious Spectator interview in 1990, predicted, in essence, what has now come to pass, and lost his ministerial job as a result. The only problem with the Ridley analysis, and similar views put forward with slightly more circumspection by his boss Margaret Thatcher, was that their tone was anti-German. This made people think that they were out-of-date, obsessed with the Second World War and unable to give Germany the credit it deserved. It blinded critics to the prescience of the grumpy duo. The Ridley/Thatcher argument was that French-led attempts to “tie down” Germany with greater European integration would have precisely the opposite effect. In particular, if a European single currency were introduced, it would be the Deutschmark in all but name. The model for “more Europe” would assuredly produce a German Europe.
So it has proved, never more visibly than last week in Cyprus. It is extremely interesting to see this admitted and analysed by a German. Ulrich Beck is a sociologist, but don’t be put off. He also has almost batty theories about how the EU can – must – be saved by some sort of European social contract and a “voluntary European year for all” in which Germans go and live in Greece and vice versa and see the other fellows’ point of view. Leave these ideas politely on one side. Concentrate instead on his brilliant and succinct analysis (the entire book is under 100 pages long) of the political genius of Angela Merkel.
Professor Beck does not like her politics at all, but he sets out lucidly why she is winning. Behind the mask of sober, correct Protestantism lurks a supremely adroit calculation of power. He calls her “Merkiavelli”.
Her methods are making her “the uncrowned queen of Europe”. The most cunning is “hesitation as a means of coercion”. Instead of forcing German money on debtor euro-states, she hints that she might not offer it at all. Gradually and bitterly, they come to realise that “Only one fate is worse than being overwhelmed by German money and that is not being overwhelmed by German money”. They succumb to her demands.
Learning from Machiavelli that the successful ruler is both loved and feared, but that, if you have to choose, it is better to be feared, Mrs Merkel has devised a brilliant strategy. She is loved at home (because she is seen to fight for German interests) and feared abroad (for the same reason). Like a one-woman hard cop/soft cop routine, she says yes and no to eurozone integration at the same time. She is a tough nationalist and a good European. No other eurozone leader has a chance against this.
Besides, Mrs Merkel’s power is grounded in the strength of the German economy and is therefore very mobile. This is much more effective than the old-fashioned German military power which proved so expensive for all concerned twice in the 20th century. As Professor Beck puts it, Germany “has no need to invade, and yet it is ubiquitous”. This too was originally a Ridley point, considered grossly offensive at the time he used it.
On top of this, Merkiavelli has not merely issued orders to the other member states, she has ensured that the German culture of “stability” in economic affairs is the orthodoxy of the age. True, there is not, as yet, a single example of German-style austerity policies actually working in the southern countries on whom it has been inflicted, but that hardly seems to matter in the terms of power politics. So strong is the idea of German financial rectitude, says Prof Beck, that Germans largely avoid being painted as the ruthless masters of Europe by being seen as “the schoolmasters of Europe”. As their youth unemployment rises to over 50 per cent, countries such as Spain and Greece can be cowed by the Merkel teaching that it is all their fault for their indiscipline and learn that they must be more “correct”. The German Europe is therefore a reality not only of power, but of official ideology. No previous German leader has achieved that.
And because modern, united, prosperous, democratic Germany is now “the best Germany we have ever had”, it is also jettisoning all the old “never again”, guilt-ridden stuff which Germans are so fed up with. It gives them permission to be proud once again – “we hear the sigh of a new 'never again’: never again should they [the Germans] have to appear as penitents”.
All this upsets Prof Beck very much, because his beloved EU has become a German-led hierarchy instead of the equality he seeks. Yet how could it be otherwise? He cannot see this, because he refuses to accept the fact that the nation-state, especially for a country of Germany’s size, remains the strongest organising principle and focus of loyalty. Mrs Merkel has a democratic mandate in the way that the EU institutions could never have. When they spoke of “Europe”, the Germans, benign though they had become, were always thinking of themselves. So they have come out on top. Unlike Prof Beck, I say, good on them for that – why shouldn’t they? I just wish the European elites had recognised this a generation earlier. It might have saved us the impoverishment of half a continent.
