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15 March 2014

Cold War Revisionism and the Defence of Obama’s Ukraine Blunder


russian parade








14 March 2014

We're Still Paying The Price For Woodrow Wilson's Failure In The Ukraine




A Russian flag inside the entrance to Crimea's regional parliament building in Simferopol on 13 March 2014



By James G. Neuger 

Woodrow Wilson didn’t care much for an independent Ukraine. 

Wilson went to the post-World War I peace conference committed to “self-determination” for other parts of eastern Europe, while keeping Ukraine tied to Moscow in the hope that a rebuilt Russian empire would reverse the Bolshevik takeover.

Wilson’s tactics in 1919, and the West’s ambivalence toward Ukraine after it finally broke free of Soviet control in 1991, show the limited options available to the U.S. and its allies in response to Vladimir Putin’s claim -- backed up by armed force Ukraine’s southern region of Crimea.

 “Catherine the Great conquered the Crimea in the 18th century just to make Russia a great power,” said Carole Fink, emeritus professor at the Ohio State University and author of “Cold War: An International History.” “Putin is responding to the tumult in Ukraine in a similarly great power strategic fashion.”

The next act in Crimea’s history comes tomorrow, when voters in the majority Russian-speaking region decide whether to sever links with Ukraine’s central government and pledge allegiance to the Kremlin. Western powers have denounced the hastily organized referendum as illegal. 

Some 59 percent of Crimea’s 2 million inhabitants are ethnic Russians, incubating the same conflicts between majority rights and minority rule that bedeviled the nation-builders -- and empire-dismantlers -- at the Paris peace conference after World War I.



Statehood Clamor



That war felled the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, bequeathing to the Allied victors a panoply of ethnic and cultural identities clamoring for statehood. The peace pitted Wilson’s “imperative principle” of self-government for formerly subject peoples against what the U.S. president dismissed as the European diplomatic ritual of drawing lines on maps in secret.Wilson was less principled on Ukraine. His opposition to a sovereign Ukrainian state was backed by the British and French, supporters of anti-Bolshevik forces in the civil war that followed the communist seizure of power in Moscow in 1917.





Ballot boxes with the coat of arms of Crimea at a polling station in the municipality of Dobroe, near Simferopol, Ukraine



British Prime Minister David Lloyd George said he had glimpsed a Ukrainian only once in his life “and I am not sure that I want to see any more,” Margaret MacMillan wrote in her 2001 book, “Peacemakers.” 

While the Paris peacemakers bestowed statehood on the likes of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Ukraine was left to be fought over by Poland and Russia. Poland seized swathes of Ukraine’s territory and the rest became part of the Soviet Union when it was founded in 1922.



Wilsonian Moment



Nor were Wilson’s ideals extended to the African, Middle Eastern and Asian colonies of European powers. 

One supplicant inspired by what Wilson called “the sacredness of the right of self-determination” was Nguyen Tat Thanh. The man later known as Ho Chi Minh petitioned the conference to grant Indochina independence from France. Wilson never replied, according to “The Wilsonian Moment,” a 2007 book by Erez Manela, a Harvard University history professor.




A man walks past a poster reading "On March 16 we will choose either... or..." and depicting Crimea in red with a swastika and covered in barbed wire, left, and Crimea with the colors of the Russian flag in Sevastopol



Ukraine’s proximity to Russia in geography, culture and commerce, and its distance from allied capitals, continues to heighten the Kremlin’s sense of national interest and give it greater leverage. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s rebuke of Russia’s pursuit of “unilateral geopolitical interests” this week was both a denunciation and acknowledgment that there is little that can stop Putin from using force.



Liberator Putin



The question now is whether Crimea’s probable vote for attachment to Russia will ignite secessionist sentiment elsewhere in eastern Ukraine, with Putin posing as the liberator of ethnic Russians eager to shake off rule by the central government in Kiev.

The evidence is mixed, said Tetyana Malyarenko, a law professor at Donetsk State University of Management in eastern Ukraine. The area around Donetsk is unlikely to rebel, she said, because it “is comparatively rich, comparable with Kiev, with a growing middle class and young people sharing western liberal values."

In Luhansk on Ukraine’s eastern fringes, separatist fervor is stronger. Malyarenko said that coal-mining territory tends to feel ignored by the central government and has “no strong local economic elite, interested in Western markets.”



Linguistic Map



The ethnic and linguistic map matters because long after minority protections were enshrined in the industrial world’s constitutions, politics in Ukraine remains defined by the duel between Ukrainians in the west and the Russian-speaking minority in the east.

Country-wide, Ukrainians make up 78 percent of the population and Russians 17 percent, according to the latest census, in 2001. The ratios flip in Crimea, consisting of 59 percent Russians, 24 percent Ukrainians and 12 percent Crimean Tatars, a Turkic-speaking Muslim group once persecuted by Stalin.

Ukraine’s parliament played cultural politics in the immediate aftermath of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych’s ouster from office, only for the tactic to backfire. Lawmakers on Feb. 23 sought to downgrade the status of Russian as an official language. That drew the ire of President Putin, who claimed that the rights of ethnic Russians were under threat.



Language Law



Less than a week later, pro-Russian forces appeared in Crimea, seizing airports and other facilities, even though the interim president eventually blocked the new language law. Today, the peninsula is effectively cut off from the Ukrainian mainland.

The Kiev parliament’s aggravation of Russian sensibilities highlights the crisis facing Ukraine, said Gwendolyn Sasse, a professor of eastern European politics at Oxford University.

“It doesn’t justify the actions Russia has taken, but it does justify concerns about the current interim government in Kiev,” she said. “What we currently see is not a national unity government.”

Crimea was the crisis that didn’t happen in the 1990s. Moves to grant it greater autonomy were under way when the Soviet Union collapsed, and the weakened Russia under Boris Yeltsin was unable or unwilling to press the claims of the region’s Russian speakers.

How today’s bolder Russia will advance those claims after the referendum is a matter of speculation.

Putin is unlikely to follow Wilson’s advice, in a speech to Congress on Feb. 11, 1918, that “peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game.”

Then again, Wilson didn’t always follow it either.






 
 

Some Straight Talk for Putin





Here’s what Obama should, but won’t, say to the Russian president.

John Kerry is shocked that Putin is not behaving the way an autocrat in the 21st century should behave, while most Americans are shocked that their secretary of state is living on another planet. Obama is of the opinion that Russia is in violation of international law, but hastens to acknowledge that Putin has a different set of lawyers than he does. You know how confusing things can get when these dictators lawyer up. Most folks thought that the rules about taking chunks of other people’s countries, when they didn’t pose a threat, have been pretty clear since the 1600s. But I’ve gotta admit, most invaders since then have not been invited in by a disgraced former president as he sat in the aggressor’s country sipping their vodka. You can see why Putin’s lawyers would think that the Russians got permission.
 One might also appreciate why our president might be a little tentative. Perhaps he is a bit sensitive about calling out another leader for lying to the people and ignoring the rule of law. Who knows?

Perhaps his reluctance is due to the fact that after his whispered message to Putin about flexibility after the election, Hillary’s reset button, our being bullied out of a missile-defense system in Eastern Europe, our being hoodwinked into accepting Russian “cooperation” in Syria, and Russia’s harboring of Edward Snowden, the administration hadn’t been humiliated by the Russians for several weeks and Obama didn’t want to mess up the opportunity for better relations. Really, all Putin seems to want is Crimea. Surely that will be the end of his aggressiveness. He wouldn’t dare risk the dreaded “isolation by the international community.”

Complicating things further for Obama is the fact that some of his intellectual soul-mates are “putting things in perspective” with arguments like these: They aren’t defending Putin, they say, but they do note that Ukraine once was part of Russia. Of course, before Ukraine was part of Russia, it used to be part of Poland. Perhaps the Poles should get their claim in. Also, these soul-mates note, Crimea is populated mostly by ethnic Russians. Never mind that this is in large part the result of Stalin putting the Crimean Tatars in boxcars and exporting them. Obama’s friends add that we can’t forget that the U.S. used to have the Monroe Doctrine. And, of course, we have the ever-popular “Iraq analogy.” I suppose that’s why Iraq is now an American province, right? And, we’re reminded, NATO is moving too close to Russia and that makes Putin nervous. After all, nobody likes it when that officious friend, liberty, comes around, showing off and setting a bad example for the kids, etc., etc.

I propose a way out of this confusion . . . a constructive solution that helps our president out of this complicated web of international law and troubling historical analogies. I suggest that Obama go with something a little more straightforward. A conversation like this:

Vladimir, we had this thing some of us call the Cold War. It cost the West a lot of lives, time, money, and aggravation. We won. You lost. You consider your loss to be a catastrophe to be rectified. We consider it to be a blessing to be preserved at all cost. That’s a pretty wide gulf. We’re not likely to bridge it. So let’s cut to the proverbial chase.

Vlad, you and your buddies are not only losers, you are bad guys. Not to put too fine a point on it, but you jail and kill people who want nothing more than the rights they are entitled to as human beings. You want to increase your power to do so. We protect such people and resist your ambitions. That makes us the good guys. When the bad guys get out of hand, the good guys shouldn’t worry too much about the details of the Treaty of Westphalia. We just have to make sure that you stay losers.

So with regard to the current unpleasantness, if you relent, you can continue doing your thing within the confines of Russia until the people get tired of you or you run out of oil and natural gas. But you are not going to expand your reach. If you don’t relent we’re going to make your life miserable and make you look as bad to your people as you have made me look to mine. Think NATO expansion, a Europe no longer dependent on you as an energy source because they can rely on the U.S. Think about the stashes and travel of your oligarchs. They will. And that missile-defense system we abandoned in the Czech Republic and Poland? Deployment will start in about a month. Bottom line? We’ve noticed you like to lose your shirt. This time, we’re gonna help with that.

We actually have little to lose. We’re getting out of Afghanistan and things couldn’t be any worse in Syria. Your aggressiveness has provided us with an opportunity to rectify some mistakes. Even I know now that we’ll have to deal with you sooner or later.

Now you can hope that we will not be able to persuade our European allies to help with this course of action, since it sometimes looks like we have to beg them to throw a bucket of water on a burning couch in their own living room. They do value their trade, oligarch money, and energy sources. And you might be tempted to count on that. But I’ll be having a conversation with them about what the point of NATO is if it can’t get it together on this. Perhaps they are prepared to forsake the alliance and spend more than a fraction of 1 percent of their own GDP on their defense. Good luck with counting on that.


Of course, Obama will never have a conversation like that with Putin. And it’s not because he fears that Russia has the upper hand, or because he is unsure of the facts on the ground or international law. It’s not even because he doesn’t understand that there will be more serious consequences to pay if we continue our display of ineptitude and weakness that so clearly invites aggression. No, I think it’s something else.

Like the average teenager, immature adults, and too many politicians, Obama values short-term considerations over long-term consequences. His “long term” is about three years from now. Everything he does has to do with his legacy in the eyes of those throughout the world whose approval he craves. This involves a certain amount of deference to the moral-equivalence argument when confrontations such as this one over Ukraine present themselves. You know the one: “America is exceptional, but everybody thinks their own country is exceptional. And who are we to tell them what to do?” This also deprives him of the use of his considerable rhetorical skills, except to draw meaningless red lines for the purpose of kicking a crisis down the road, and rhetoric is important.

While my suggested message to Putin is not necessarily to be taken literally in every aspect, I doubt whether Ronald Reagan really expected Gorbachev to tear down that wall, either. But he inspired others to do it and gave new hope to all who seek freedom. That’s part of the job of a president of the United States. At least it used to be.



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