05 September 2013

Declaring War Is One Power That The President Absolutely Does Not Have










‘Obama has the constitutional authority to strike Syria.  He doesn’t need Congress.  The Commander-in-Chief gets to decide with whom and where we go to war.  That is exactly how the Founding Fathers intended it.’

-  Myriad posters on HotAir.com and other sites yesterday



Not exactly, as the minutes of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 demonstrate:



‘Mr MADISON and Mr GERRY moved to insert ‘declare,’ striking out ‘make’ war, LEAVING TO THE EXECUTIVE THE POWER TO REPEL SUDDEN ATTACKS.




The Framers’ entire purpose by substituting ‘declare’ for ‘make’ was to prevent the Executive from waging war without authorisation and unilaterally.  They understood the need for the President to act quickly when the nation’s defence and security was at stake…in the case of an invasion or sudden attack on American interests…and gave him that authority, but they did NOT give him the power to wage war, unilaterally or with the cooperation of the world, preemptively, or to save face.

As you can see from the following quote by Charles Pinkney was in the small minority arguing for the placement of unilateral power to make war to be placed in the hands of the President solely.



‘Mr Pinkney opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps. would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in Senate, so as to give no advantage to large States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace.’

- Minutes from the Constitutional Convention, 17 August 1787



South Carolina’s Pierce Butler also argued that the Executive be given the authority to ‘make war.’

In addressing both Pinkney and Butler, Elbridge Gerry spoke for the majority.  Before the vote that would make the change he and Madison requested, he stood before the body and said:



‘[I] never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.’
 


The proposal of Butler and Pinkney was summarily rejected by the Constitutional Convention, which is why the Constitution grants:



Article I, Section 8:

The Congress shall have power…

[To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions



Furthermore, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 states:



The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.



If Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 gave the Commander-in-Chief the sole authority to decide when and where to use the military against foreign states, especially, there would be no need for the language in Article I, Section 8.

Madison reported that in the Federal Convention of 1787, THE PHRASE ‘MAKE WAR’ WAS CHANGED TO ‘DECLARE WAR’ IN ORDER TO LEAVE TO THE EXECUTIVE THE POWER TO REPEL SUDDEN ATTACKS, BUT NOT TO COMMENCE WAR WITHOUT THE EXPLICIT APPROVAL OF CONGRESS.

And, one wonders whether the Framers would have given the Executive the power in even such cases had they enjoyed the same transportation, communication, and technological conveniences that we have today, but that's speculation for another day.

If those that believe the definitions of ‘war,’ ‘making war,’ or ‘declaring war’ have somehow changed over the last two-plus centuries, as apparently and unfortunately some do, then read the Founders’ words themselves:



'THE CONSTITUTION VESTS THE POWER OF DECLARING WAR IN CONGRESS; THEREFORE NO OFFENCIVE EXPEDITION OF IMPORTANCE CAN BE UNDERTAKEN UNTIL AFTER THEY SHALL HAVE DELIBERATED UPON THE SUBJECT AND AUTHORISED SUCH A MEASURE.'

- President George Washington, 1793

   

‘The Constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the Legislature.’

- James Madison in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, 1789



'The power to declare war, including the power of judging the causes of war, is FULLY AND EXCLUSIVELY vested in the legislature . . . the executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war.'

- Thomas Jefferson, 1793



‘This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our interest can draw us into war.’

- James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention



‘In most of these particulars, the power of the President will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York. The most material points of difference are these: -- First. The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. Second. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies -- ALL WHICH, BY THE CONSTITUTION UNDER CONSIDERATION, WOULD APPERTAIN TO THE LEGISLATURE.  The governor of New York, on the other hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States.’

- Alexander Hamilton, a proponent of the centralisation of power in the Federal government, a supporter of a very strong Executive, and a Nationalist, if there ever was one, Federalist #69



Hamilton was quite emphatic in his orations and words that the President, although unauthorised to 'declare war,' would be empowered over 'the direction of war when authorised or begun' as Commander-in-Chief.  Further, as I wrote above, Hamilton, who once even argued that the United States should have a King so he was no shrinking violet when it came to the idea of Utilitarianism being invested in the Executive, specifically acknowledged that a President, unilaterally, was only empowered to 'repel sudden attacks' on the nation, its military, or its interests.  The decision to 'declare war' was given to the Congress leaving the President the necessary emergency power to act militarily in the case of a foreign attack.  Of course the FDR could legally order the US military to return fire at Pearl Harbour - but, you'll notice that he went to Congress to seek a Declaration of War on Japan within 24 hours and received it.  Of course the President could order airstrikes in immediate retaliation for a foreign power's attack on an American Embassy.  No one is arguing otherwise. 

Even Abraham Lincoln, who dealt with the most serious threat to the continued existence of the United States some three score and twelve years later and who had his own problems with abiding by the Constitution (see Ex Parte Milligan, for example) disagreed that the President could ‘declare war’ or even ‘make war’:



To allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose — and you allow him to make war at pleasure…. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, after you have given him so much as you propose. If, to-day, he should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade Canada, to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, ‘I see no probability of the British invading us’ but he will say to you ‘be silent; I see it, if you don’t.

The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where kings have always stood.’

- President Abraham Lincoln



As Constitutional attorney and expert, Bruce Fein, has written:



'The authors of the United States Constitution manifestly intended Article I, Section VIII, Clause XI to fasten exclusive responsibility and authority on the Congress to decide whether to undertake offensive military action.'



And, the spotlight on 'offencive military action' quite naturally leads us to the next argument...



‘There is a good reason Thomas jefferson did not ask Congress for authorization when he sent 2/3′s of the Navy/Marines into the ‘Shores of Tripoli’ and started a long war with the Barbary Pirates and their State Sponsors.’

- jp on September 4, 2013 at 4:48 PM



Seriously?  And, you have claimed to be a historian on this matter...

Let’s start with this one since you claim Jefferson didn’t ask Congress for authorisation:



‘I communicate [to you] all material information on this subject, that in the exercise of this important function confided by the Constitution to the Legislature exclusively their judgment may form itself on a knowledge and consideration of every circumstance of weight...CONSIDERING THAT CONGRESS ALONE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVESTED WITH THE POWER OF CHANGING OUR CONDITION FROM PEACE TO WAR, I HAVE THOUGHT IT MY DUTY TO AWAIT THEIR AUTHORITY FOR USING FORCE IN ANY DEGREE WHICH COULD BE AVOIDED.'
 
- President Thomas Jefferson to Congress on the subject of the Pasha’s DOW and the actions of the Barbary Pirates



Second, Jefferson did not declare war in response to the Pasha’s declaration or act preemptively. He ordered ships to be armed AS A MEASURE OF SELF-DEFENCE.

Third, Congress approved an AUMF on 6 February 1802.

So that there is no mistake in understanding how Jefferson understood the power to declare war, let us turn to his own words from 1805:



‘[…when Spain appeared to have an] intention to advance on our possessions until they shall be repressed by an opposing force. Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force…. But the course to be pursued will require the command of means which it belongs to Congress exclusively to yield or to deny. To them I communicate every fact material for their information and the documents necessary to enable them to judge for themselves. To their wisdom, then, I look for the course I am to pursue, and will pursue with sincere zeal that which they shall approve.’


 
************************


‘War Powers resolution allows the President to use military force for 60 days without authorization or declaration of war by Congress…’

- mnjg on September 5, 2013 at 1:42 PM



First, let’s look at what the War Powers Resolution Act actually says with regard to its purpose and policy:



(a) Congressional declaration

It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces INTO HOSTILITIES, OR INTO SITUATIONS WHERE IMMINENT INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES IS CLEARLY INDICATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Congressional legislative power under necessary and proper clause

Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer hereof.

(c) Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; LIMITATION

The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to:

(1) a declaration of war,

(2) specific statutory authorization, or

(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.


Has Syria declared war on the United States?

No, but AQ has and it is part of the ‘rebels’ of whom we are asked to arm and assist.

Is there yet any specific statutory authorisation for airstrikes on Syria?

Not yet.

Has a national emergency been created by an attack from Syria upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces?

Nope.

Second, the War Powers Resolution Act, which was only passed after Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and President Nixon continued military engagement in Vietnam, has been argued by every President since - and many scholars – to be unconstitutional.  Fine.  Let them bring it before the Court and have it finally sorted out.  You'll notice that they haven't and, perhaps, it is because of what the Supreme Court has already said:



'It is the exclusive province of Congress to change a state of peace into a state of war.'

- Justice William Paterson writing for the Court in United States v Smith, 1806



Now, there are those that claim both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were illegal because Congress never 'declared war' on either country.  The fact of the matter is that neither the Constitution nor Federal law stipulate the form in which a declaration of war from Congress must take.  So, if Congress must formally declare war, then it is sort of strange that there wasn't a DECLARATION OF WAR for the First Barbary War, which occurred during Jefferson's Presidency, and the Second Barbary War, which occurred during Madison's administration, given that the former is considered the Father of the Declaration of Independence, in which the abuses of the King (a utilitarian executive) were cited at length, and the latter is called the Father of the Constitution because he was its primary author and, presumably, knew exactly what was intended by it.  Rather than issuing formal declarations in either, Congress passed AUMFs for both. 

Ron Paul and many Paulistinians joined with a plethora of Democrats, including quite a few of those who actually voted for both resolutions, to claim that both Afghanistan and Iraq were illegal wars.  (I opposed both the Afghan ground war and the Iraq War, but neither was illegal.)  Yet, like both Barbary Wars, Congress granted AUTHORISATION to the President to wage war for both.  As the court ruled in Doe v Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003), concerning the Iraq War:



'[T]he text of the October Resolution itself spells out justifications for a war and frames itself as an 'authorisation' of such a war.'



The Supreme Court denied cert effectively agreeing with the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  Thus, neither the Constitution nor Federal law requires a formal 'declaration of war,' i.e., a document entitled as such, but, as the War Powers Resolution Act makes clear - for those of whom the Constitution didn't already - the only power that a President has to wage war is that, specifically, recognised by Congress. 

As Garrett Epps wrote in The Atlantic several days ago – and I concur:


‘U.S. citizens and military personnel are not under attack. It is not a split-second emergency. The President does not face a request from the Security Council, NATO, the Arab League or even the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

This is precisely the kind of situation for which the Framers of our Constitution designed its division of authority between President and Congress. Sending our missiles against Syria is an act of war. If it is to be done, Congress, not the president, should approve.’


America has not been attacked by President Bashar al-Assad.

US citizens have not been attacked by the Syrian government save for the idiotic American jihadis that flew over to join Al-Nusra, the rebel group affiliated with Al-Qaeda.  Do we have a duty to protect their fellow travellers?  Not ‘No.’  Not ‘Hell No.’  But, ‘FUCK NO!’  To argue otherwise would be to claim that FDR should have intervened in the Spanish Civil War to protect a few American Communists, who decided to go fight Franco, or refrained from bombing Japan because Tokyo Rose might break a fingernail.  These are ‘innocent’ Americans about which we are talking.  They have picked up guns and joined in another country’s civil war.  Call their deaths or maiming ‘assumption of the risk’ that goes along with putting yourself on a civil war battlefield in another country in which your native land is uninvolved.

The American military is not under attack nor is there a high probability of a preemptive attack by Syria.  Assad might be a ‘thug’ and a ‘murderer,’ but he’s not stupid, which is an excellent reason not to rule out the rebels, who have been caught with sarin gas previously, as those responsible for the attack that, allegedly, has Obama’s knickers in a twist.  Neither is Putin or Iran.

If a President believes he can, unilaterally, do whatever he wants with OUR (not ‘his’) military, then he needs to declare martial law, suspend the Constitution, and see how that works out for him...and, I’ll bet that that it won’t turn out well.


PS:  Here are the minutes from 17 August 1789.  I want you all to read them so that you can understand clearly what happened that day and exactly what the Framers intended:
 

Tuesday August 17, 1787 [FN1]
IN CONVENTION

Art VII. Sect. 1. [FN1], [FN2] resumed. on the clause "to appoint [FN3] Treasurer by ballot."

Mr. GHORUM moved to insert "joint" before ballot, as more convenient as well as reasonable, than to require the separate concurrence of the Senate.

Mr. PINKNEY 2ds. the motion. Mr. SHERMAN opposed it as favoring the larger States.

Mr. READ moved to strike out the clause, leaving the appointment of the Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive. The Legislature was an improper body for appointments. Those of the State legislatures were a proof of it. The Executive being responsible would make a good choice.

Mr. MERCER 2ds. the motion of Mr. Read.

On the motion for inserting the word "joint" before ballot N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN4]

Col. MASON in opposition to Mr. Reads motion desired it might be considered to whom the money would belong; if to the people, the legislature representing the people ought to appoint the keepers of it.

On striking out the clause as amended by inserting "Joint" N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [FN5]

[FN6] "To constitute inferior tribunals" [FN7] agreed to nem. con. [FN8]

"To make rules as to captures on land & water"-do. d [FN9] [FN6] "To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies &c" &c [FN10] considered.

Mr. MADISON moved to strike out "and punishment" &c. [FN11]

Mr. MASON doubts the safety of it, considering the strict rule of construction in criminal cases. He doubted also the propriety of taking the power in all these cases wholly from the States.

Mr. GOVERNR. MORRIS thought it would be necessary to extend the authority farther, so as to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting in general. Bills of exchange for example might be forged in one State and carried into another: It was suggested by some other member that foreign paper might be counterfeited by Citizens; and that it might be politic to provide by national authority for the punishment of it.

Mr. RANDOLPH did not conceive that expunging "the punishment" would be a constructive exclusion of the power. He doubted only the efficacy of the word "declare."

Mr. WILSON was in favor of the motion. Strictness was not necessary in giving authority to enact penal laws; though necessary in enacting & expounding them.

On motion [FN12] for striking out "and punishment" as moved by Mr. Madison

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN13]

Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to strike out "declare the law" and insert "punish" before "piracies." and on the question N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN14]

Mr. MADISON, and Mr. RANDOLPH moved to insert, "define &," before "punish."

Mr. WILSON, thought "felonies" sufficiently defined by common law.

Mr. DICKENSON concurred with Mr. Wilson.

Mr. MERCER was in favor of the amendment.

Mr. MADISON. felony at common law is vague. It is also defective. One defect is supplied by Stat: of Anne as to running away with vessels which at common law was a breach of trust only. Besides no foreign law should be a standard farther than [FN15] is expressly adopted-If the laws of the States were to prevail on this subject, the citizens of different States would be subject to different punishments for the same offence at sea. There would be neither uniformity nor stability in the law-The proper remedy for all these difficulties was to vest the power proposed by the term "define" in the Natl. legislature.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS would prefer designate to define, the latter being as he he conceived, limited to the preexisting meaning.- It was said by others to be applicable to the creating of offences also, and therefore suited the case both of felonies & of piracies. The motion of Mr. M. & Mr. R was agreed to.

Mr. ELSEWORTH enlarged the motion so as to read "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the U. States, and offences agst. the law of Nations" which was agreed to nem. con.

[FN16] "To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its legislature." [FN17]

Mr. PINKNEY moved to strike out "on the application of its legislature"

Mr. Govr. MORRIS 2ds.

Mr. L. MARTIN opposed it as giving a dangerous & unnecessary power. The consent of the State ought to precede the introduction of any extraneous force whatever.

Mr. MERCER supported the opposition of Mr. Martin.

Mr. ELSEWORTH proposed to add after "legislature" "or Executive."

Mr. Govr. MORRIS. The Executive may possibly be at the head of the Rebellion. The Genl. Govt. should enforce obedience in all cases where it may be necessary.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. In many cases The Genl. Govt. ought not to be able to interpose, unless called upon. He was willing to vary his motion so as to read, "or without it when the legislature cannot meet."

Mr. GERRY was agst. letting loose the myrmidons of the U. States on a State without its own consent. The States will be the best Judges in such cases. More blood would have been spilt in Massts. in the late insurrection, if the Genl. authority had intermeddled.

Mr. LANGDON was for striking out as moved by Mr. Pinkney. The apprehension of the national force, will have a salutary effect in preventing insurrections.

Mr. RANDOLPH. If the Natl. Legislature is to judge whether the State legislature can or cannot meet, that amendment would make the clause as objectionable as the motion of Mr. Pinkney.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS. We are acting a very strange part. We first form a strong man to protect us, and at the same time wish to tie his hands behind him, The legislature may surely be trusted with such a power to preserve the public tranquility.

On the motion to add "or without it [application] when the legislature cannot meet" [FN18]

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN19] So agreed to- [FN20]

Mr. MADISON and Mr. DICKENSON moved to insert as explanatory, after "State"- "against the Government thereof" There might be a rebellion agst. the U. States-which [FN21] was Agreed to nem. con.

On the clause as amended N. H. ay. Mas [FN22] abst. Ct. ay. Pen. abst. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg. ay-so it was lost. [FN23]

[FN24] "To make war"

Mr. PINKNEY opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps. would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in [FN25] Senate, so as to give no advantage to [FN25] large States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace.

Mr. BUTLER. The objections agst. the Legislature lie in [FN26] great degree agst. the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it. Mr. MADISON and Mr. GERRY moved to insert "declare," striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.

Mr. SHARMAN thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" [FN27] better than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too much.

Mr. GERRY never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.

Mr. ELSWORTH. there is a material difference between the cases of making war and making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of war, than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. peace attended with intricate & secret negociations.

Mr. MASON was agst. giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to "make."

On the motion to insert declare-in place of make, it was agreed to. N. H. no. Mas. abst. Cont. no. [FN29] Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md.

ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN31]

Mr. PINKNEY'S motion to strike out [FN32] whole clause, [FN33] disagd. to without call of States.

Mr. BUTLER moved to give the Legislature [FN32] power of peace, as they were to have that of war.

Mr. GERRY 2ds. him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise the power if vested in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may consequently give up part of the U. States. The Senate are more liable to be corrupted by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.

On the motion for adding "and peace" after "war" [FN34] N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no S. C. no. Geo. no. [FN35]

Adjourned

FN1 See ante.

FN2 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN3 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN4 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, no-3."

FN5 In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye-4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no-6."

FN6 The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

FN7 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN8 The phrase "as also the clause" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN9 The words "do. do." are omitted in the transcript.

FN10 The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN11 In the transcript the following phrase is here added: "after the words, ' To declare the law."'

FN12 The words "the question" are substituted in the transcript for "motion."

FN13 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, no-3."

FN14 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, no-3."

FN15 The word "it" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN16 The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

FN17 The phrase "was next considered" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN18 The phrase "it was agreed to" is here added in the transcript.

FN19 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-5; Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, no-3; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, divided."

FN20 The words "So agreed to" are omitted in the transcript.

FN21 The words "The motion" are substituted in the transcript for "which."

FN22 In the printed Journal, Mas. no.

FN23 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia, Georgia, aye-4; Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, no-4; Massachusetts, [FN22] Pennsylvania, absent. So it was lost."

FN24 The words "The elause" are here inserted in the transcript.

FN25 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN26 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN27 The word "is" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN28 The transcript here inserts the following: "Connecticut voted in the negative; but."

FN29 On the remark by Mr. King that "make" war might be understood to "conduct" it which was an Executive function, Mr. Elseworth gave up his objection, and the vote of Cont. [FN30] was changed to-ay.

FN30 The words "of Cont. are omittd in the transcript.

FN31 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, [FN29] Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; New Hampshire, no-1; Massachusetts, absent."

FN32 The word "the" is here inserte in the transcript.
  
FN34 The transcript here adds the following: "it was unanimously negatived."



Note:  'Artistic licence' was taken with the incredible Michael Ramirez's cartoon.

 


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